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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effectiveness of trade credit and quantity discount in supply chain 
coordination when the sales effort effect on market demand is considered. In this paper, we consider a two-echelon 
supply chain consisting of a single retailer ordering a single product from a single manufacturer. Market demand is 
stochastic and influenced by retailer sales effort. As it is found that the trade-credit-only model cannot achieve the 
perfect coordination of the supply chain, we have developed a hybrid, quantitative, analytical model for supply chain 
coordination by coherently integrating incentives of trade credit and quantity discount with sales effort effects. The 
results demonstrate that, providing that the discount rate satisfies certain conditions, and if the income distribution ratio 
is restricted to a certain range; the proposed hybrid model combining trade credit and quantity discount will be able to 
effectively coordinate the supply chain by motivating retailers to exert their sales effort and increase product order 
quantity. Furthermore, the hybrid quantitative analytical model can provide great flexibility in coordinating the supply 
chain to achieve an optimal situation through the adjustment of relevant parameters to resolve conflict of interests from 




Trade credit is a form of delayed payments for the 
transfer of goods and services that upstream suppliers 
allow downstream retailers to settle the payments at the 
end of the sales period. Trade credit has been referred to 
be one of the important sources of short-term financing 
for the firms and could play an important role to firms’ 
growth potential, competitive advantage, and survival 
[1-3]. In addition, it is also an effective incentive and 
coordination contract [4-8]. Trade credit is widely used 
in enterprises of various industries in China, the United 
States and Europe [1-3]. Suppliers provide trade credit 
for downstream retailers, allowing them to postpone 
payments. For retailers, trade credit can reduce their 
capital occupation and encourage them to increase order 
quantities. At the same time, suppliers receive more 
product wholesale income. So trade credit has been 
regarded as a way to coordinate the supply chain. 
Along with the fast advancement of technologies, 
more intensive competition from markets and more 
diversifying customer needs, the lifecycle of many 
products has been greatly shortened in the industries, 
especially in fashion, electronics and software [9].The 
sales season for such products is very limited. For 
short-life-cycle products, if trade credit is reached 
between a supplier and a retailer, the retailer will be 
encouraged to increase the order quantity, and then they 
should exert much sales effort to sell quickly in a shorter 
period. Otherwise, it is easy to cause inventory risk. In 
many settings, retailer sales effort is important in 
influencing market demand. Retailers can influence 
demand by hiring more sales personnel, improving their 
sales skills and increasing advertising and so on [10-12]. 
However, there are relevant costs attached to the 
retailer’s sales effort. By offering trade credit to the 
retailer, the supplier needs to pay a certain amount of 
capital cost, but they can enjoy benefits from higher 
market demand influenced by retailer sales effort. Hence, 
in the face of such conflicts of interests, how to optimize 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Plymouth Electronic Archive and Research Library
 
the decisions-making and coordinate the supply chain is 
a very important issue for both the supplier and the 
retailer. 
To understand the role of trade credit in coordinating 
supply chain while taking into account the effects of 
retailer sales effort on market demand, we develop a 
quantitative analysis model based on trade credit. We 
show that when retailer sales effort influences market 
demand, trade credit cannot achieve supply chain 
coordination.   
In many cases, the composite mode based on two or 
more different contracts is often designed to coordinate 
the supply chain [13-14, 8]. In this paper, we propose a 
hybrid analytic model under a composite contract with 
trade credit and quantity discount. We find that when 
retailer sales effort influences demand, the composite 
contract can fully achieve supply chain coordination. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 provides a review of existing article about 
trade credit. Section 3 discusses the development and 
analysis of analytic models under a single trade credit 
considering sales effort effects on demand. The hybrid 
analytical model under a composite contract with trade 
credit and quantity discount is proposed in Section 4, 
followed by an application example in Section 5. Finally, 
Section 6 draws conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
Haley and Higgins[15] firstly studied trade credit in the 
operation management. Since then, the buyer’s inventory 
policy under given trade credit terms has been concerned 
for a long time. Goyal [16] considered the EOQ model 
under trade credit. Huang [17] extended Goyal [16] 
model to two-part terms of trade credit. Teng et al. [18] 
and Taleizadeh et al. [19] further supplemented the study 
of Huang [17]. Later, Mahata [20], Soni and Joshi [21]，
Chen et al. [22]，and Wu et al. [23] studied the EOQ or 
EPQ model for deteriorating items under the two-part 
trade credit. 
 Instead of setting trade credit as a given parameter, 
several articles took trade credit as a decision variable 
from the vendor’s or the supply chain’s point of view. 
Kim et al. [24] and Abad and Jaggi [25] developed a 
model to find the optimal credit period for the vendor by 
taking price-sensitive demand into consideration. Zhou 
et al. [26] determined the supplier's credit policy 
considering inventory-dependent demand and limited 
displayed-shelf space. Wang et al. [27] developed the 
EOQ model to study the supplier's optimal credit period 
and cycle time for deteriorating items. Tsao [28] built the 
EPQ model under maintenance, variable setup costs, and 
trade credits. Pramanik et al. [29] built the EOQ model 
based on three level partial trade credit. 
However, these above studies did not consider the 
issue of supply chain coordination. Taking trade credit as 
a mechanism to coordinate a supply chain, Jaber and 
Osman [30] may be the first study. They studied how to 
set order quantity and trade credit to minimize the cost of 
the whole supply chain under constant demand. Luo [7] 
and Yang et al. [31] proved that trade credit is a new 
supply chain incentive mechanism which is not equal to 
the quantity discount. Luo and Zhang [32] further 
explored the role of trade credit in coordinating supply 
chains in the case of asymmetric information on the 
buyer’s capital cost. Sarmah et al. [33] investigated the 
issue of supply chain coordination with trade credit in 
the context of multi-heterogeneous buyers.  
Chaharsooghi and Heydari [34] considered the 
credit period as a mechanism to develop coordination in 
a multi-period setting. Arkan and RezaHejazi [35] 
extended Chaharsooghi and Heydari [34] model by 
assuming that lead time and ordering cost are 
controllable. 
Zhong and Zhou [36] developed a performance 
improving model through trade credit by assuming that a 
retailer had limited storage space and faced an 
inventory-dependent end demand. Das et al. [37] 
developed an integrated production inventory model 
under trade credit for a constant deteriorating item. 
Ouyang et al. [38] proposed an integrated inventory 
model under trade credit with capacity constraint and an 
order-size dependent payment period. Sarkar et al. [6] 
studied the multi-level trade credit and 
single-setup-multiple-delivery policy for the 
coordination of a global sustainable supply chain.  
Most previous studies on the role of trade credit in 
coordinating supply chain failed to consider the 
newsvendor model which is an important mathematical 
model for uncertain demand. Lee and Rhee [8] examined 
relatively early the issue of supply chain coordination 
based on trade credit in a Newsvendor framework. 
Zhang et al. [39] proposed a modified quantity discount 
based on both order quantity and advance payment while 
considering the manufacturer's risk aversion. Yang et al. 
[40] proposed a two-period continuous newsvendor 
model under a two-part trade credit contract and 
examined the influence of the revenue sharing rates on 
the optimal early payment time from a coordination 
perspective. Tsao et al. [41] presented newsvendor 
models to maximize total profits while taking into 
account uncertain demand, trade credits, carbon 
 
emissions, and the risk of default simultaneously.  Cao 
and Yu [42] investigated the financing and coordination 
of an emission-dependent supply chain by trade credit. 
Heydari et al. [4] and Tsao [5] introduced two-level trade 
credits into supply chain coordination for uncertain 
demand. Xiao et al. [14] examined whether revenue- 
sharing, buyback, and trade credit contracts can 
coordinate a constrained supply chain. 
 In many settings, retailer sales effort is very 
important in influencing the market demand. But 
literature has not adequately addressed retailer’s sales 
effort effect on market demand while exploring the 
supply chain coordination through trade credit. In this 
paper, we construct newsvendor models to explore the 
issue of supply chain coordination under trade credit 
when the market demand is influenced by retailer sales 
effort. We also derive the optimal sales effort policy and 
order quantity policy. And we further present 
newsvendor models to maximize total profits while 
considering trade credit, order quantity discount, and 
market demand with sales effort effects simultaneously, 
and examine the effect of quantity discount rates on the 
retailer's and supplier's policies from a coordination 
perspective. 
3. A Trade-Credit-only Model with Sales   
  Effort Effects 
We consider a supply chain with a risk-neutral retailer 
and a risk-neutral supplier. The retailer makes a single 
purchase of a product from the manufacturer. The 
manufacturer dominates and first sets trade credit 
contract. Then, the retailer determines order quantity and 
sales effort according to contract terms and market 
situation, and pays off all payment at the end of sales 
period. To focus on the essential model feature, we 
assume that the manufacturer's production capacity is not 
limited and can provide all goods for the retailer to meet 
the demand. 
The retailer faces the random market demand. We 
assume the demand which is not influenced by sales 
effort be 𝛿 with a cumulative distribution function 𝐹(𝛿) 
and a probability density function 𝑓(𝛿). Let the market 
demand with sales effort effects be 𝛿′ in which demand 
is stochastic and multiplicative function of retailer sales 
effort. Specifically, let 𝛿′ be given by 𝑒𝛿, where 𝑒 is 
the level of  retailer’s sales effort [11-12]. The cost to 
the retailer of exerting 𝑒 units of sales effort is 𝐶(𝑒) 
which is increasing, convex, and differentiable in 𝑒 , 
where 𝑒 ≥ 1  and 𝐶(1) = 0 . Thus, the marginal 
effectiveness of sales effort is constant, and the marginal 
cost of sales effort is increasing. 
Notations used are presented as follows. 
𝑞: the order quantity of the retailer 
𝑝𝑚 : the unit product wholesale price provided by 
manufacturer 
𝑐𝑚: the manufacturer’s unit product production cost  
𝑝𝑟: the retailer’s unit product sales price 
𝑐𝑟: the retailer’s unit product sales cost 
𝑣: salvage value of unit product unsold at the end of 
the sales period 
𝑡: trade credit period 
𝑖𝑚: the manufacturer’s unit capital cost rate 
𝑖𝑟: the retailer’s return on investment 
𝑒: the retailer’s sales effort level 
𝜃: the quantity discount ratio 
𝐼𝐼𝑙
𝑚: manufacturer’s expected profit 
𝐼𝐼𝑙
𝑟: retailer’s expected profit 
𝐼𝐼𝑙
𝑠: system expected profit 
𝑙=1，2，3, respectively, denotes the 3 different cases 
To avoid unrealistic and trivial cases, we assume that 
𝑝𝑚 > 𝑐𝑚 > 𝑣, 𝑝𝑟 > 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑐𝑟, and 𝑖𝑟 > 𝑖𝑚. In addition, 
the supplier allows the retailer to delay payment, so term 
period 𝑡 meets t > 0. 
In the case of general stochastic market demand, 
comparing the product market demand 𝛿 and the order 
quantity 𝑞 , we define the retailer's expected product 
sales 𝑆(𝑞 ) = 𝐸(𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑞 , 𝛿)) = 𝑞 − ∫ 𝐹(𝛿)
𝑞
0
𝑑𝛿 , and 
the expected product residual amount 𝑇(𝑞 ) =
𝐸(𝑞 − 𝛿)+ = 𝑞 − 𝑆(𝑞 ) . In the case of the market 
demand affected by the sales effort level, comparing the 
product market demand δ
′
and the order quantity q, we 
define the retailer's expected product sales: 





 And the expected product residual amount is   
𝑇(𝑞 , 𝑒) = 𝐸(𝑞 − 𝑒𝛿)+ = 𝑞 − 𝑆(𝑞 , 𝑒) 
To help fully expose the benefits of the developed 
trade credit models, this section will use two scenarios: 
decentralised and centralised coordination decisions. 
Literature has extensively discussed how to develop 
trade credit models without consideration for sales effort 
level [4-5,8,39-42]. This paper will not repeat the details. 
However, for comparison purpose the expected profit 
functions are built for the retailer, the manufacturer and 
the supply chain system under trade credit contract in the 
case of the general stochastic demand, as follows:  
∏ (𝑞)𝑟1 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡) (𝑝𝑟𝑆(𝑞) + 𝑣𝑇(𝑞)) − 𝑐𝑟𝑞 − 𝑝𝑚𝑞  
= (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)(𝑞 − ∫ 𝐹(𝛿)𝑑𝛿
𝑞
0
) + [(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣  
−𝑐𝑟 − 𝑝𝑚]𝑞  
∏ (𝑞)𝑚1 = 𝑝𝑚𝑞 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚𝑞  





((1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣 − 𝑐𝑟 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚)𝑞  
Thus, for the market demand without sales effort 
effects, the retailer’s optimal order quantity 𝑞1
𝑟 and the 
supply chain system’s optimal order quantity 𝑞1
𝑠 are as 
follows, respectively. 
𝑞1
𝑟 = 𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+𝑝𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
)     
𝑞1




3.1 Decentralized Decision Scenario 
In the case of the market demand affected by sales 
effort, the expected profit functions of retailers and 
manufacturers under decentralized decision model can be 
developed as follows. 





((1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣 − 𝑐𝑟 − 𝑝𝑚)𝑞 − 𝐶(𝑒)               (1) 
∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑚2 = 𝑝𝑚𝑞 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚𝑞            (2) 
Proposition 1 Under decentralized decision scenario 
with sales effort effect, we obtain the retailer’s optimal 
order quantity as 
𝑞2
𝑟 = 𝑒𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+𝑝𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
)         (3) 
And the optimal effort level e2




𝑟 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅 (
𝑞
𝑒2
𝑟⁄ )             (4) 
Here 𝑅(𝑞) = ∫ 𝛿𝑑
𝑞
0
𝐹(𝛿)               
Only when equation (3) satisfies equation (4), the 
retailer is able to achieve the greatest profit. Thus, the 
optimal order quantity of the retailer is q2 
r =e2
r q1
r , and 
then the optimal sales effort level e2




𝑟 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑟)                (5) 
Proof:  See "Appendix A." 
Theorem 1 In the trade credit contract, by considering 
sales effort level, the optimal order quantity of the retailer 
in the decentralized decision mode is not lower than that 










𝑟 = 𝑒𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+𝑝𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
), it is found 𝑞2
𝑟 =
𝑞1
𝑟 when 𝑒 = 1 in 𝑞2
𝑟. Thus, it is not difficult to find 
𝑞2
𝑟 ≥ 𝑞1
𝑟 when 𝑒 ∈ [1, ∞). At the same time, it can be 
found that with the increase of the sales effort, the 
retailer's order quantity will be also increased. 
Theorem 1 shows that improving the sales effort level 
can increase the retailer's order quantity ∆𝑞 = 𝑞2
𝑟 − 𝑞1
𝑟 
because the high level of sales service quality promotes 
the market demand for retailer’s products. 
Theorem 2 In the decentralized decision model, the 
retailer’s expected profits ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑟2  and the 
manufacturer’s expected profits ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑚2  will increase 
as the sales effort level e increases. Compared with that 
when sales effort remains constant (𝑒 = 1), the retailer 
will make itself and the manufacturer respectively obtain 
higher profits if it raises the level of sales effort to the 
optimal level, that is, ∏ (𝑞2
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2 > ∏ (𝑞1 
𝑟 , 𝑒 = 1)𝑟2 ，
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑚2 > ∏ (𝑞1 
𝑟 , 𝑒 = 1)𝑚2 . 
Proof: (1) Let  
∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑟2 = 𝑒(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑟) − 𝐶(𝑒) ， where 
𝑞 = 𝑒𝑞1
𝑟 . The first order partial derivative of 𝑒  for 
equation ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑟2  is  
𝜕 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑟2
𝜕𝑒









𝑟 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑟) from 



























≥ 0 , further it can be obtained that 
∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑟2  is an increasing function on 𝑒 ∈ 𝑒2
𝑟. With the 
increase of the retailer's sales effort, the expected return 
of the retailer is also increasing. But the retailer only 
allows sales effort to be promoted to the best effort level 
𝑒2
𝑟. 
It is obtained ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑟2 = ∏ (𝑞1 
𝑟 , 𝑒 = 1)𝑟2  when the 
sales effort level remains constant (e=1). Therefore, it is 
easy to know as follows. 
∏ (𝑞 = 𝑒2
𝑟𝑞1
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2 > ∏  (𝑞 = 𝑞1 
𝑟  , 𝑒 = 1)𝑟2 , that is, 
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2 > ∏ (𝑞1 
𝑟 , 𝑒 = 1)𝑟2 . 
(2) Let ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒) =𝑚2 (𝑝𝑚 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚)𝑒𝑞1
𝑟, and it is 
obtained ∂ ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)/𝜕𝑒 =𝑚2 (𝑝𝑚 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚t)𝑐𝑚)𝑞1
𝑟 >
0 . 
Obviously, ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑚2  is an increasing function on 
𝑒 ∈ [1, ∞), so the manufacturer wants the retailer to 
maximize the level of sales effort because the 
manufacturer does not have to bear the effort cost. 




∏ (𝑞 = 𝑞1 
𝑟  , 𝑒 = 1)𝑚2 , that is, 
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑚2 > ∏ (𝑞1 
𝑟 , 𝑒 = 1)𝑚2 . 
3.2 Centralized Decision Scenario 
This subsection analyses the coordination effect of the 
trade credit contract considering the level of sales effort 
in the centralized decision mode. In this case, the overall 
expected profit function of the system is constructed:    





((1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣 − 𝑐𝑟 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚)𝑞 −  𝐶(𝑒)       (6)  
Proposition 2 Under centralized decision scenario 




𝑠 = 𝑒𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+(1+𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
)           (7) 




𝑠 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠)      (8) 
Where 𝑅(𝑞1





Proof:  See "Appendix B." 
Theorem 3 In the trade credit contract, when sales 
effort level is considered, the optimal order quantity of 
the system under the centralized decision mode is not 
lower than that under the general stochastic market 
demand, that is, 𝑞2 
𝑠 ≥ 𝑞1
𝑠. 
Proof:  Comparing 𝑞1
𝑠 = 𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+(1+𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
)  with 𝑞2
𝑠 = 𝑒𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+(1+𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
), it is found 𝑞2 
𝑠 = 𝑞1
𝑠 when 𝑒 = 1 
in 𝑞2
𝑠. Therefore, it is not difficult to find 𝑞2 
𝑠 ≥ 𝑞1
𝑠 for 
𝑒 ∈ [1, ∞). 
Theorem 3 shows that the customer demand for the 
retailer’s products will be expanded, furthermore, the 
retailer will be encouraged to increase its order quantity 
when sales effort level increases. In this way, the 
system's demand for funds is satisfied by improving the 
reasonable allocation of the flow of funds in the supply 
chain system, thereby increasing the system's order 
quantity. 
Theorem 4 In the centralized decision model, the 
system’s expected profit ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑠2  will increase as the 
sales effort level e increases. Compared with that when 
the sales effort remains constant ( 𝑒 = 1 ), system’s 
overall profit would become higher if the retailer raises 
the level of sales effort to the optimal level 𝑒2
𝑠, that is, 
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2 > ∏ (𝑞1
𝑠, 𝑒 = 1)𝑠2 . 
Proof:  See "Appendix C." 
3.3 The Effects of Trade Credit Terms on Decisions and  
   Profits 
Theorem 5 In the trade credit contract, when sales 
effort is considered, the retailer's optimal effort level 𝑒2
𝑟 
and optimal order quantity 𝑞2 
𝑟  as well as the supply 
chain system’s optimal effort level 𝑒2
𝑠 and optimal order 
quantity 𝑞2 
𝑠  will increase as the trade credit period 𝑡 
increases. 
Proof:  See "Appendix D." 
Theorem 6 In the trade credit contract that considers 
the sales effort level, when the retailer determines the 
optimal effort level 𝑒2
𝑟, there exists always a trade credit 
period t̂ such that the retailer’s optimal expected profit 
is 𝑁𝑟 . ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2  is not lower than 𝑁
𝑟  for 𝑡 ∈
[?̂?, +∞) and increases with the increase of the trade 
credit periodt. When the supply chain system determines 
the optimal effort level 𝑒2
𝑠, there is always a trade credit 
term ?̃? so that the optimal expected return of the supply 
chain system is 𝑁𝑠. ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2  is not lower than 𝑁
𝑠 
for 𝑡 ∈ [?̃?, +∞) and increases as the trade credit period 
𝑡 increases. 
Proof:  See "Appendix E." 
Theorem 6 shows that the trade credit could encourage 
the retailer to improve the level of optimal efforts and 
further to stimulate the retailer to increase the quantity of 
orders. In addition, the benefits of the retailer and the 
overall supply chain can increase as the trade credit 
period is longer. These theorems show that the trade 
credit provided by the manufacturer helps to positively 
affect the supply chain while considering the retail sales 
effort level. 
3.4 Comparing Centralized Decision Scenario and  
   Decentralized Decision Scenario 
Theorem 7 In the trade credit contract, with the 
market demand influenced by sales effort, the optimal 
sales effort level, optimal order quantity of the retailer 
and the system’s optimal profit under the decentralized 
decision mode are lower than those under the centralized 
decision mode, that is, 𝑒2
𝑟 < 𝑒2
𝑠 ， 𝑞2 
𝑟 < 𝑞2 
𝑠 ，
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑠2 < ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2 . 
Proof:  See "Appendix F." 
Theorem 7 shows that both the manufacturer and the 
retailer are rational, and their goal is to maximize their 
own interests, so the game will lead to the sales effort 
level and the order quantity to become distorted, that is, 
𝑒2
𝑟 < 𝑒2
𝑠 and 𝑞2 
𝑟 < 𝑞2 
𝑠 . Then, the system’s profits also 
appear to be hurt, i.e., ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑠2 < ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2 . 
For the manufacturer, it could only make the decision 
on the wholesale price of the product and the trade credit 
term. The number of products offered depends on the 
retailer’s order quantity. 
It can be obtained 
𝜕 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑚2
𝜕𝑞
= 𝑝𝑚 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚 > 0 
from equation (2), and then the expected profit of the 
manufacturer increases with the increase in the retailer’s 
order quantity. From the retailer's point of view, if the 
order quantity increases from 𝑞2 
𝑟  to 𝑞2 
𝑠 , the retailer 
cannot accept that because 𝑞2 
𝑠  exceeds its optimal order 
quantity. However, this case will result in damage to the 
overall interests of the system, so trade credit contracts 
that consider sales efforts cannot achieve perfect 
coordination between the manufacturer and the retailer. 
Of course, to persuade the retailer to increase the order 
quantity, the manufacturer can provide the retailers with 
 
quantitative discount contracts to make up for the loss of 
the retailer due to increasing the order. 
4. A Hybrid Quantitative Model under   
  Trade Credit and Quantity Discount   
  with Sales Effort Effects 
In a quantitative discount mechanism, the 
manufacturer encourages the retailer to increase the 
amount of the order by reducing the wholesale price per 
unit of the product. In this paper, a quantity discount 
mechanism with a ratio 𝜃 is introduced. The expected 
profit function of the retailer and the manufacturer under 
the portfolio coordination contract respectively are as 
follows: 





((1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣 − 𝑐𝑟 − 𝜃𝑝𝑚)𝑞－𝐶(𝑒)               (9) 
∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑚3 = 𝜃𝑝𝑚𝑞 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚                
(10) 
In the combined contract, it is a trade credit contract 
that takes into account the level of sales effort when 𝜃 =
1. In this case, both sides can benefit as the sales efforts 
improve, but the retailer will lack the intrinsic incentive 
and motivation to improve sales efforts because it has to 
bear the full cost of effort. However, the manufacturer 
who does not have to make any effort but to enjoy the 
benefits of increasing the level of sales effort expects the 
retailer to provide a higher level of sales effort. 
Therefore, there is a certain conflict of interests between 
the two sides. When 𝜃 = 0, the manufacturer's product 
wholesale price is 0, and its profit is negative, which is 
unrealistic. Thus, a reasonable discount ratio needs to 
satisfy 0 < 𝜃 < 1. 
Proposition 3 Under decentralized decision scenario, 
we consider incentive contract integrating trade credit 
and quantity discount when sales effort influences the 
market demand. We obtain the optimal order quantity as 
𝑞3
𝑟 = 𝑒𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+𝜃𝑝𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
)              (11) 




𝑟 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞0)          (12) 









Proof:  See "Appendix G." 
From Proposition 3, the retailer's optimal expected 
profit is ∏ (𝑞3 
𝑟  , 𝑒3
𝑟)𝑟3 = 𝑒3
𝑟(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞0) −
𝐶(𝑒3
𝑟) , and the optimal expected profit of the 
manufacturer is  
∏ (𝑞3 
𝑟  , 𝑒3
𝑟𝑐)𝑚3 = (𝜃𝑝𝑚 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚)𝑒3
𝑟𝑞0  
Theorem 8 Considering the level of sales effort, 
comparing the hybrid model of the trade credit and 
quantity discount with the single trade credit contract, 
the optimal sales effort level 𝑒3
𝑟 of the retailer in the 
former case is higher than the optimal sales effort level 
𝑒2
𝑟 in the latter case, that is, 𝑒3
𝑟 > 𝑒2
𝑟. The optimal order 
quantity 𝑞3 
𝑟  of the retailer in the former case is higher 
than the optimal order quantity 𝑞2 
𝑟  in the latter case, 
that is, 𝑞3 
𝑟 > 𝑞2 
𝑟 . In addition, the optimal effort 
level  𝑒3
𝑟  and the optimal order quantity 𝑞3 
𝑟  of the 
retailer increase with the decrease in 𝜃 under the hybrid 
coordination contract.  
Proof:  See "Appendix H." 
Theorem 8 shows that with the introduction of a 
quantity discount mechanism in a trade credit contract 
that considers the level of sales effort, the retailer is 
encouraged to increase the order quantity by reducing the 
wholesale price of products. At the same time, under the 
hybrid coordination contract, with the decrease in 𝜃 and 
the decrease in the wholesale price of the manufacturer's 
products, the retailer is encouraged to improve the 
optimal effort level and increase its order quantity. 
To achieve the perfect coordination of the supply 
chain system under the hybrid coordination contract, the 
retailer's order quantity needs to increase to 𝑞2 
𝑠 . 
Theorem 9 When the quantity discount ratio θ 
offered by the manufacturer satisfies the following 
conditions:   ?̅? =
(1+𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚
𝑝𝑚
          (13) 
Quantity discount contract based on the trade credit 
can make the supply chain reach the optimal state. In the 
meantime, ?̅? increases with the increase in the trade 
credit period 𝑡. 
Proof:  See "Appendix K." 
Theorem 9 shows that the quantity discount ratio ?̅? 
causing the supply chain to achieve the coordination 
increases with the increase of the trade credit period 
provided by the manufacturer. It can be further analysed 
that when the trade credit period 𝑡  increases, the 
manufacturer's commitment to the capital opportunity 
cost will increase, so it will improve the discount ratio ?̅? 
to make up for its own losses. Similarly, when the trade 
credit period t is reduced, the manufacturer can 
compensate for the reduction in the retailer’s earnings by 
reducing the quantity discount ratio ?̅?. 
According to Theorem 9, the manufacturer's expected 
profit is zero when the supply chain achieves the perfect 
coordination, which is unacceptable to the manufacturer. 
To achieve coordination, it is necessary to reallocate the 
total revenue ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠3 of the supply chain system, 
which assigns 𝜑  proportion of ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠3  to the 
manufacturer and 1 − 𝜑ratio to the retailer. After the 
 
reallocation, the manufacturer’s expected revenue 
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑟4  should be not lower than the expected 
revenue ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2  without the introduction of the 
quantity discount contract, and the retailer’s expected 
revenue ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑚4  should be not lower than the 
expected revenue ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑚2  without the introduction 
of quantity discount contract. 
Theorem 10 When the income distribution 






















   (14) 
At this time, the manufacturer is willing to provide the 
quantity discount ratio which meets the equation (13), 
and the expressions ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑟4 ≥ ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2  and 
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑚4 ≥ ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑚2  have been established. 
Proof:  See "Appendix L." 
Theorem 10 shows that in the case of the market 
demand affected by the retailer's sales effort level, when 
the quantity discount ratio 𝜃 and the profit distribution 
ratio 𝜑  satisfy equation (13) and equation (14), the 
portfolio coordination contract of the trade credit 
considering the sales effort level and the quantity 
discount can realize the coordination of the supply chain, 
that is, the system stays to achieve the optimal state. By 
adjusting the distribution of the system income through 
the parameter 𝜑,  the flexibility of the system is 
increased and the effective cooperation between the two 
is promoted. 
5. An Illustrating Example 
We now employ numerical examples to further analyse 
the trade credit model and the hybrid model integrating 
trade credit and quantity discount when the sales effort 
influences the market demand. In the supply chain 
configuration, we suppose that 𝑝𝑚 = 60,𝑝𝑟 = 188, 𝑐𝑟 =
40,𝑣 = 20,𝑖𝑚 = 10%,𝑖𝑟 = 12%, assume the sales effort 
cost follows 𝐶(𝑒) = 500(e − 1)2  and the market 
demand 𝛿  is subject to normal distribution, 
i.e.,𝛿~𝑁(100, 502).  
First, we analyse the impact of the retailer's sales 
effort level on the order quantity and the expected profit. 
The results are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 1 Chang trend of order quantity of retailer and supply 
chain with sales effort level (𝑡=1) 
 
FIGURE 2 Chang trend of expected profit of retailer and 
manufacturer and supply chain with sales effort level (𝑡=1) 
As seen in Figure 1, in the case that the credit period is 
determined, the increase in the level of sales effort can 
prompt the retailer and supply chain system to 
respectively improve the order quantity. This is because 
the level of sales effort has an impact on the market 
demand, which indirectly increases the number of 
products ordered by increasing the market demand, thus 
increasing the order of the supply chain system. 
As found in Figure 2, the expected profit of the retailer 
tends to rise first and then fall with the increase of the 
sales effort level. When 𝑒 = 𝑒2
𝑟, the benefits and the 
effort costs coming with increasing the order quantity 
reach equilibrium, so the retailer can receive its 
maximum expected profit. The manufacturer’s expected 
profit increases with the increase of the sales effort level, 
so it is beneficial for the manufacturer when the retailer 
invests more effort. The expected profit of the supply 
chain system tends to rise first and then fall with the 
increase of the sales effort level. When 𝑒 = 𝑒2
𝑠 , the 
system can receive maximum expected profit. However, 
in the real world, the retailer does not incur a higher sales 
effort level than 𝑒2
𝑐, so the retailer and manufacturer's 
 
expected profit will increase with the increase of the 
sales effort level on e ∈ [1, 𝑒2
𝑟]. Similarly, the supply 
chain system does not incur a higher sales effort level 
than 𝑒2
𝑠, so the expected profit of supply chain system 
will increase with the increase of sales effort level on 
e ∈ [1, 𝑒2
𝑠]. 
Then, the analysis is done about the impact of trade 
credit period on the decision and the optimal expectation 
profits of the retailer, the manufacturer and the supply 




in Section 3.1, we determine the range of credit period 𝑡 
in 0 < 𝑡 < 10 is determined based on the above data 
set. Figures 3, 4 and 5 are obtained by using MATLAB 
software to the developed model. 
 
FIGURE 3 Chang trend of optimal sales effort level of retailer 
and supply chain with trade credit period 
 
FIGURE 4 Chang trend of optimal order quantity of retailer and 
supply chain with trade credit period 
 
FIGURE 5 Chang trend of optimal expected profits of retailer 
and manufacturer and supply chain with trade credit period 
As seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4, the trade credit 
period provided by the manufacturer has a positive 
impact on the optimal sales effort level and optimal order 
quantity for the retailer and the supply chain system. As 
found in Figure 5, the optimal expected profits of both 
the retailer and the supply chain system increase with the 
increase in the trade credit period, but the optimal 
expected profit of the manufacturer decreases with the 
increase in the trade credit period. This is because if the 
manufacturer allows the retailer to delay the payment of 
goods, the retailer could use this payment to invest and 
gain investment income, and the manufacturer would 
increase capital opportunity cost. 
 
FIGURE 6 Chang trend of quantity discount ratio with trade credit 
period when the supply chain reaches coordination 
As is seen from Figure 6, the longer is the trade credit 
period 𝑡 provided by the manufacturer, the greater is the 
quantity discount ratio ?̅? , which means that the 
manufacturer can adjust the 𝑡  and ?̅?  parameters to 
balance its own decisions. When the trade credit period 
𝑡 increases, the manufacturer takes on greater capital 
opportunity costs, but it can increase the discount ratio 
?̅? to make up for its own loss, and when the trade credit 
 
period 𝑡 decreases, the manufacturer can compensate 
for the reduction in its profit by reducing the quantity 
discount radio ?̅?. 
6. Conclusions 
Considering trade credit as a tool for supply chain 
coordination, when market demand is influenced by 
retailer sales effort, we construct the quantitative models 
in a newsvendor framework respectively based on the 
single trade credit contract and the composite contract 
combining trade credit and quantity discount. And we 
calculate and analyze the models by Stackelberg game 
theory and optimization theory. Some interesting insights 
are obtained as following. 
First, when retailer sales effort influences market 
demand, a single trade credit cannot perfectly coordinate 
the supply chain, that is, the optimal sales effort level 
and order quantity and system’s profit under the 
decentralized decision scenario are lower than those 
under the centralized decision scenario. 
Second, based on a single trade credit, when retailer 
sales effort influences market demand, the optimal order 
quantity as well as the profits of the manufacturer and 
retailer and supply chain are higher than those when 
retailer sales effort does not influence market demand. 
Whether under decentralized decision scenario or under 
centralized decision scenario, when sales effort 
influences the market demand, the optimal effort level 
and optimal order quantity increase as trade credit period 
increases, respectively. 
Third, considering trade credit and order quantity 
discount and sales effort effects on the demand, we show 
that when model parameters meet certain conditions, the 
composite contract combining trade credit and quantity 
discount can realize the perfect coordination of supply 
chain and a “win-win” outcome. Furthermore, the 
composite contract can provide great flexibility in 
coordinating the supply chain through adjusting relevant 
parameters. 
In future studies, we can extend the models to the 
three-tier supply chain (manufacturer-retailer-consumer 
supply chain). And we can also continue the study from 
the perspective of information asymmetry. For example, 
when the sales effort is private information of the retailer, 
we explore the supply chain coordination under trade 
credit.  
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 


































(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑓(
𝑞
𝑒⁄ )； 




0 ，  the Hessian matrix of the binary function 







































Therefore, according to optimization theory, 
∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑟2  has the only optimal solution (𝑞2 
𝑟 ，𝑒2
𝑟) on 
𝑞 ∈ (0， + ∞) ∪ 𝑒 ∈ [1, +∞) , and respectively 
satisfies the following first order conditions. 
𝜕 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑟2
𝜕𝑞
= (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑝𝑟 − 𝑐𝑟 − 𝑝𝑚  
−(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝐹(
𝑞
𝑒⁄ ) = 0  
𝜕 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑟2
𝜕𝑒






𝑒⁄ (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝐹(
𝑞
𝑒⁄ ) − 
𝑑𝐶(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒
= 0  
At this time, the retailer’s optimal order quantity 𝑞2
𝑟 
can be obtained. 
𝑞2
𝑟 = 𝑒𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+𝑝𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
)         (A1) 
Additionally, the optimal effort level 𝑒2
𝑟  of the 





𝑟 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅 (
𝑞
𝑒2
𝑟⁄ )          (A2) 
Here 𝑅(𝑞) = ∫ 𝛿𝑑
𝑞
0
𝐹(𝛿)             
Only when equation (A1) satisfies equation (A2), 
the retailer is able to achieve the greatest gain. Thus, 









𝑟 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑟)    
Hence, we conclude the proof. 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2 


































(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑓(
𝑞
𝑒⁄ )； 




0，it can be determined the Hessian matrix |𝐻| of the 








Therefore, according to optimization theory, 
∏ (𝑞, 𝑒) 𝑠2 has the only optimal solution (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠), and 




= (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑝𝑟 − 𝑐𝑟 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚 −
(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝐹(
𝑞
𝑒⁄ ) = 0  
𝜕 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑠2
𝜕𝑒











= 0  
Then, it is obtained: 
𝑞2
𝑠 = 𝑒𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+(1+𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)




𝑠 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅 (
𝑞
𝑒2





Equation (B1) shows the relationship between the 
optimal order quantity and the sales effort level, so the 








)  in 
order to ensure the system’s best benefits, and the 





𝑠 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠)  
Therefore, the system’s optimal expected profit 
is  ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2 = 𝑒2
𝑠(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠) −
 𝐶(𝑒2
𝑠). Hence, we conclude the proof. 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 4 
Let ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑠2 = 𝑒(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠) −  𝐶(𝑒) ，
where 𝑞=𝑒𝑞1
𝑠. The first order partial derivative of 𝑒 
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𝑠 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠) 











Then, 𝐶′(𝑒) is monotonically increasing on 𝑒 ∈
[1, 𝑒2
𝑠]  because of 
𝑑2𝐶(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒2







𝑠 , that is 
𝜕 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑠2
𝜕𝑒
≥ 0 , further it is 
obtained that ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒) 𝑠2 is an increasing function on 
𝑒 ∈ [1, 𝑒2
𝑠]. At this time, the level of sales effort in the 
supply chain system varies from 1 to 𝑒2
𝑠 , and the 
expected return of the entire system is improved. 
∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑠2 = ∏ (𝑞1 
𝑠  , 𝑒 = 1)𝑠2  is accurate when the 
sales effort level remains constant (e=1). 
Therefore, ∏ (𝑞 = 𝑒2
𝑠𝑞1
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2 > ∏ (𝑞 = 𝑞1 
𝑠  , 𝑒 = 1)𝑠2  




𝑠, 𝑒 = 1)𝑠2 . Hence, we conclude the proof. 
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 5 













= 𝑖𝑟(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1




















𝑟) .  
Because 𝐹(𝛿) is a continuously differentiable and 






















𝑓(𝛿)𝑑𝛿 , it is known that 
𝛿𝑓(𝛿) > 0 and  𝑞1
𝑟 > 0 , so 𝑅(𝑞1
𝑟) > 0  is right. 
Then, the right-hand side of equation (8) is greater 
than zero.  
In addition, according to the assumption that 
𝐶(𝑒) in the interval 𝑒 ∈ [1, +∞) is a monotonically 
increasing convex function, the first part of the 




> 0 is established. 













= 𝑖𝑟(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1































> 0 is available, so the 
retailer's optimal effort level 𝑒2
𝑟 and the supply chain 
system's optimal effort level 𝑒2
𝑠  increase with the 
increase of the trade credit period 𝑡. 
































> 0. It is obtained 
𝑞2
𝑠 = e2




 from equation (7).  



























> 0 is available, so the retailer's 
optimal order quantity 𝑞2
𝑟  and the supply chain 
system’s optimal order quantity 𝑞2
𝑠 increase with the 
increase of the trade credit period  𝑡 . Hence, we 
conclude the proof. 
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 6 




𝑟(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑟) −  𝐶(𝑒2
𝑟) , we take the 
derivative of 𝑡 for ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2  and obtain  




= [(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
















   
                                       (E1)  
It is seen that the first part of the right-hand side of 





> 0，we obtain 





Therefore, there exists always a minimum trade credit 
period t̂, when the retailer’s optimal expected return 
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2  is 𝑁
𝑟. Then, it has been proven correct 
that ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2  is not lower than 𝑁
𝑟  for 𝑡 ∈
[?̂?, +∞)  and increases as the trade credit 
period t increases. 




𝑠(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠) −  𝐶(𝑒2
𝑠) , we take the 
derivative of 𝑡 for ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2  and obtain 























  It is seen that the first part of the right-hand side 





> 0  has been proven correct, 




> 0 is established. Therefore, there always 
exists a minimum trade credit period t̃  when the 
retailer’s optimal expected return ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2  is 𝑁
𝑠. 
Then, it has been proven correct that ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2  is 
not lower than 𝑁𝑠 for 𝑡 ∈ [?̃?, +∞) and increases as 
the trade credit period 𝑡 increases. 
Hence, we conclude the proof. 




= 𝑞𝑓(𝑞) > 0 and then 𝑅(𝑞1
𝑟) <
𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠) according to 𝑞1
𝑟 < 𝑞1
𝑠, 𝑅(𝑞) is monotonically 








𝑠  by comparing equation (5) with 
equation (8), and because 𝐶′′(𝑒) > 0, that is, 𝐶′(𝑒) 
is monotonically increasing on 𝑒 ∈ [1, ∞), 𝑒2
𝑟 < 𝑒2
𝑠 
is proved to be correct. 
(2) 𝑞2 
𝑟 < 𝑞2 

















= (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑝𝑟 − 𝑐𝑟 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚 
−(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝐹(
𝑞




= 0, We obtain 
(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑝𝑟 − 𝑐𝑟 − (1 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚  
= (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝐹(𝑞2 




= (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)(𝐹(𝑞2 
𝑠 𝑒⁄ ) − 𝐹(𝑞 𝑒⁄ ) . 
F(𝛿) is strictly increasing function, and 𝑞2 





> 0 proves correct, that is, ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑠2  is 
monotonically increasing on 𝑞 ∈ [𝑞2 
𝑟 , 𝑞2 
𝑠 ]. Therefore, 
it can be obtained ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2 < ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2  from 
𝑞2 
𝑟 < 𝑞2 
𝑠  for any 𝑒.  














𝑠 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅 (
𝑞
𝑒2























𝑠 is established 
when 𝑒 ∈ [𝑒2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2 















 is also correct, so it can be obtained 
𝜕 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑠2
𝜕𝑒
≥ 0  on 𝑒 ∈ [𝑒2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2 
𝑠 ] , that is, ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)𝑠2  is 
monotonically increasing on 𝑒 ∈ [𝑒2 
𝑟 , 𝑒2 
𝑠 ]. Therefore, 
we can obtain ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑠2 < ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2  from 
𝑒2
𝑟 < 𝑒2
𝑠  for any 𝑞  given. Thus, ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑠2 <
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2  proves correct. 
Hence, we conclude the proof. 
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 3 
We take the second order partial conduct of 𝑞 for 







(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑓(
𝑞
𝑒⁄ ) 
It is obvious that 
𝜕2 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑟3
𝜕𝑞2
< 0  because of 
𝑓(
𝑞
𝑒⁄ ) > 0  and  𝑝𝑟 > 𝑣 . So ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒)
𝑟
3  has the 
only optimal solution 𝑞3 
𝑟  on 𝑞 ∈ (0，∞) , which 
meets 
𝑞3
𝑟 = 𝑒𝐹−1 (1 −
𝑐𝑟+𝜃𝑝𝑚−(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)𝑣
(1+𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟−𝑣)
)                                  
The retailer’s optimal order quantity is 𝑞0  and 




) when 𝑒 = 1.  
We take the second order partial conduct of 𝑒 for 













 It is obvious that 
𝜕2 ∏ (𝑞,𝑒)𝑟3
𝜕𝑒2
< 0  because of 
𝑓(
𝑞
𝑒⁄ ) > 0  and  
𝑑2𝐶(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒2
> 0. So ∏ (𝑞, 𝑒) 𝑟3 has the 
only optimal solution 𝑒3









As a result, the retailer's optimal order quantity is 
𝑞3 
𝑟 = 𝑒3






𝑟 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞0)   
Hence, we conclude the proof. 
Appendix H. Proof of Theorem 8 
Comparing equation (5) and equation (12), since 
0 < 𝜃 < 1  and 𝐹−1(𝛿)  is a continuous and 
monotonically increasing function, it is known 𝑞0 >
𝑞1 









𝑟 . Then, because 𝐶
′(𝑒) is 
a monotonically increasing function,  𝑒3
𝑟 > 𝑒2
𝑟  has 
been proven correct. 
It is obvious that 𝑞3 
𝑟 > 𝑞2 










We take the first order partial conduct of 𝜃 for 



































< 0 because of 

























< 0, so the optimal effort level 𝑒3
𝑟 and 
the optimal order quantity𝑞3 
𝑟 of the retailer increase 
with the decrease in 𝜃, respectively. 
Hence, we conclude the proof. 
Appendix K. Proof of Theorem 9 
(1) If the supply chain is to be coordinated, it must 
 
be satisfied that the variables (𝑞3 
𝑟  , 𝑒3
𝑟) in the 
decentralised decision mode equal to the variables 
(𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2















𝑠 = (1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠), 














                 (K1) 










It is obtained ?̅? =
(1+𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑐𝑚
𝑝𝑚
 by solving equation 
(K1). At that time, the retailer is encouraged to 
increase his order quantity to 𝑞2 
𝑠  and realizes the 
supply chain’s perfect coordination. The retailer’s 
expected profit is 
∏ (𝑞3 
𝑟  , 𝑒3
𝑟)𝑟3   
= ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑟3 = 𝑒2
𝑠(1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡)(𝑝𝑟 − 𝑣)𝑅(𝑞1
𝑠) −  𝐶(𝑒2
𝑠)  
= ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2 = ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠3   
 And the manufacturer’s expected profit is 
∏ (𝑞3 
𝑟  , 𝑒3
𝑟)𝑚3 = ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑚3 = 0  
This shows that when the supply chain realizes the 
coordination, the supply chain system achieves the 
best income and the retailer enjoys all the benefits, 
while the manufacturer's earning is 0. 






> 0 by taking the 
derivative of t for the equation (13). 
Hence, we conclude the proof. 
Appendix L. Proof of Theorem 10 
In order for the manufacturer to be willing to 
provide a quantity discount to satisfy equation (14), 
the following conditions must be met: 
{
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑟4 ≥ ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑟2
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑚4 ≥ ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑚2
         (L1) 
Where, ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑟4 = (1 −
𝜑) ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠3 ,   ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑚4 = 𝜑 ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠3 . 
Therefore, by plugging 𝑞2 
𝑠 ,  𝑒2,
𝑠  𝑞2,
𝑟  𝑒2
𝑟  into 











































Then we obtain the following equation: 






























It is obvious that 𝜑2 − 𝜑1 > 0  because of 
∏ (𝑞2 
𝑠  , 𝑒2
𝑠)𝑠2 > ∏ (𝑞2 
𝑟  , 𝑒2
𝑟)𝑠2 . Then, the condition 
𝜑1 ≤ 𝜑 ≤ 𝜑2 is established. 
Hence, we conclude the proof. 
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